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Abstract 
The discourse on population growth has generally given a picture that the increase in the population of any 
society will negatively affect the utilisation of resources and ultimately overall development. A school of thought 
gave the impression that the more the population increases, the greater is the poverty, leading to 
underdevelopment, especially for countries in transition. This argument led to various suggestions and attempts 
at population control and huge budgetary spending, neglecting positive aspects of population size, particularly in 
the period of demographic transition, and stressing that growth in population size, especially at certain periods, 
could not lead to and promote development. But can population growth not be a blessing to growth, especially 
for the rural areas? This paper was anchored in demographic dividend and labour force models. Utilising some 
theoretical expositions and drawing from the lessons of countries that have transformed from underdevelopment 
to developed nations, the paper argued that demographic dividend can be harnessed for the development of 
especially rural areas in transitional countries like Nigeria. The paper concluded with the submission that, in 
order to tackle the pervasive poverty in Nigeria, disjointed and inconsistent rural development policies should be 
jettisoned and the utilization of rural population for the supply of economic goods and services for the overall 
development of the country embraced. 
Keywords: Demographic dividend; rural poverty; labour force framework; rural areas; unemployment. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Issue of population growth has been of great concern across societies and globally. This is because the size of the 
population of any society affects the utility of resources and most importantly overall development. Classical 
views on population are based on the foundational works of Malthus and Marx, on whose views the Neo-
Malthusians and Neo-Marxists have continued to build their cases in explaining population patterns and trends. 
The beginning of the modern approach to demographic theorizing dates back to 1798, when Thomas Malthus 
first published his seminal work entitled An Essay on the Principle of Population. Critical of the optimistic views 
prominent among other Enlightenment Scholars, Malthus produced a provocative account of the role of 
population in human society. Painting a deliberately bleak picture of humanity’s future, Malthus agreed that 
societies may experience considerable technological and social progress, but maintained that population growth 
would always overwhelm the means of sustenance (Isuigo-Abanihe, 2009).   
Among the earliest and most forceful critics of Malthus was Karl Marx, who did not directly argue with 
Malthus on the point of why and how population grew, but was sceptical of the eternal laws of nature as Malthus 
saw it. Marx preferred instead to view human activity as the product of a particular social and economic 
environment. The basic Marxist perspective is that each society at each point in history has its own law of 
population that determines the consequences of population growth. For capitalism, the consequences are 
overpopulation and poverty; whereas, for socialism, population growth is readily absorbed by the economy with 
no side effects (Isuigo-Abanihe, 2009). For Marx, the cause of poverty and population problem could not be that 
the poor are producing many children, as Malthus saw it, but poverty should be blamed on the inherently 
oppressive character of capitalist societies. To Marx, only a social order built on socialist principles would 
eliminate unemployment and the so-called population problems, in a well-organized society, if there were more 
people, there ought to be more wealth, not more poverty. Discussions in this paper will be divided into two 
major areas: theoretical expositions and relating demographic transition to rural development in Nigeria. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The general objective of this paper is to posit, contrary to the generally held belief, that greater population can 
lead to greater development. In addition, it is argued that a strategic development policy to tackle the 
demographic challenge in the rural areas is what is required to truly harvest the dividends of high population. 
The position of this paper is that population growth can be a blessing if the dividend of some population growth 
is properly harnessed. First, the pursuit of this position discussion will be divided into two major areas: 
theoretical expositions and relating demographic transition to rural development in Nigeria.  
 
Literature Review 
Demographic Transition Theory 
Demographers have generally examined trends in the population with the attendant postulation of demographic 
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transition theory. According to Isuigo-Abanihe (2009), in the works of Thompson (2003) and Notestein (1945), a 
distinct explanation of these phenomenal changes, as well as the large changes among world regions, stemmed 
from the demographic transition theory, which was built on the experience of currently developed societies, and 
suggests that societies pass through five stages in the process of change. The five transition stages are explained 
as follows: 
▪ In stage one, in pre-industrial society, death rates, and birth rates are high and roughly in balance (fluctuated 
rapidly according to natural events, such as famine, drought, and disease). All human populations are 
believed to have had this balance until the late 18th century, when this balance ended in Western Europe. 
During this agricultural revolution, birth and death rates both tend to be very high in this stage and because 
both rates are approximately in balance, population growth is typically very slow in stage one. 
▪ In stage two, that of a developing country, the death rates drop rapidly owing to improvements in food supply 
and sanitation, which increase life pans and reduce disease. The improvements specific to food supply 
typically include selective breeding and crop rotation and farming techniques. Other improvements generally 
include access to technology, basic health care, and education. For example, numerous improvements in 
public health reduce mortality, especially childhood mortality. Prior to the mid-20th century, these 
improvements in public health were primarily in the areas of food handling, water supply, sewage, and 
personal hygiene. Interestingly, one of the variables often cited is the increase in female literacy combined 
with public health education programmes which emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The death 
rate decline without a corresponding fall in birth rates which produces an imbalance and the countries in this 
stage experience a large increase in population. 
▪ In stage three, birth rates fall owing to access to contraception, increases in wages, urbanization, a reduction 
in subsistence agriculture, an increase in the status and education of women, a reduction in the value of 
children’s work, an increase in parental investment in the education of children and other social changes. 
Population growth begins to level off. The birth rate decline in developed countries started when 
contraception improvement played a role in birth rate decline. Notwithstanding, contraceptives were not 
generally available nor widely used in the 19th century and, then, it did not play a significant role in the 
decline. Birth rate decline was caused by a transition in values and not just because of the availability of 
contraceptives. 
▪ In stage four, there are both low birth rates and low death rates. Birth rates drop to well below replacement 
level, as it is happening in countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan, leading to a shrinking population, a 
threat to many industries that rely on population growth. As the large group born during stage two ages, it 
creates an economic burden on the shrinking working population. Death rates may remain consistently low or 
increase slightly as a result of increases in lifestyle diseases arising from low exercise levels, high obesity, 
and an aging population in developed countries. However, by the late 20th century, birth rates and death rates 
in developed countries levelled off at lower rates. 
▪ In stage five, some theorists argue that a fifth stage is needed to represent countries that have sub-replacement 
fertility (that is, below 2.1 children per woman). Most European and many East Asian countries now have 
higher death rates than birth rates. In this stage, population aging and population decline will eventually occur 
to some extent if mass migration does not occur. However, some theorists submitted that there may be a 
further stage of demographic development. According to Myrskyla, Koller, and Billari (2009), advances in 
developments reverse fertility declines, showing that previously negative relationship between national 
wealth (as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI)) and birth rates have become J-shaped. 
Development promotes fertility decline at low and medium HDI levels, but advanced HDI promotes a 
rebound in fertility (Myrskyla et al., 2009). In many countries with very high levels of development (around 
0.95) fertility rates are now approaching two children per woman, although there are exceptions, notably in 
Germany and Japan (Myrskyla et. al. 2009). 
Demographic transition is the window of opportunity for implementation of development-oriented 
government policies. This one-type gift of the demographic transition is expected to provide lots of opportunities 
for development and economic gains. During the transition population, growth and changes in the age structure 
of the population are inevitable, if appropriate policies are pursued (Ingle and Suryawanshi, 2011). The debate 
on the relationship between population growth and economic development followed from the critics of the 
theory of Malthus in 18th century. While economists have often focused on the size of the population and the 
growth of nation, the composition of population age structure has not been considered under most of the studies 
(Coale and Hoover, 1958). But in recent years, demographers, such as Bloom et al. (1998), have studied the type 
of composition of age structure of population and its effect on economic growth and the concept of 
“demographic dividend” emerged. 
If mortality and fertility decrease, a young population can become the engine for the national economy. 
The experience of the Asian Tigers is a proof (Sippel et al., 2011). At the beginning of their impressive 
development, these countries had a demographic starting point similar to that of many sub-Saharan countries 
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today and their level of development at that time was just as bad. The development boost of the Asian Tigers was 
made possible by two fundamental changes. First, a demographic bonus was created because the number of 
people of working age increased in relation to the number of dependant young and old people. In order to create 
such a favourable age structure, the children and adolescents have to grow up, mortality in the working age 
group must decrease, and fertility must decline so that the upcoming young generations (and the related burden) 
will shrink (Sippel et al., 2011). Second, the demographic bonus could be transformed into a demographic 
dividend, that is into a gain for the national economy, because the employable people actually had the 
opportunity to become employed. For this, people must be educated and jobs have to be created. The Asian 
Tigers have simultaneously invested in education and family planning, and have carried out necessary economic 
reforms and initiatives (Sippel et. al., 2011).  
In addition, these countries recognized that the labour participation by women is absolutely necessary 
for economic progress and that education is a crucial prerequisite for this goal. It was exactly this comprehensive 
approach which made the successes of the Tiger States possible (Sippel et al., 2011). Even if the concept of 
demographic dividends cannot simply be transferred from the Asian Tigers to the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa owing to cultural, political, and economic differences, the way to the demographic dividend, in principle, 
is open for the African states. Yet politics have to determine the correct course. As long as mortality, especially 
child mortality, and fertility remain as high in sub-Saharan Africa as they currently are, a demographic bonus 
cannot emerge and, therefore, no opportunity for economically favourable development will arise. Investments 
in health and family planning, as well as in education can be identified as the most important starting points to 
attain a demographic bonus (Sippel et al., 2011).  
Africa currently belongs to those regions experiencing the highest economic and population growth 
worldwide. At present, the world population has reached seven billion and still continues to grow rapidly – at 
around 79 million a year. This is equivalent to an increase of about 216,000 people a day (United Nations (UN); 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA); and Population Division (PD), 2009b). This growth largely 
takes place in the less developed countries. But even within this group, growth varies markedly: the population 
in developing countries is growing by 1.2 per cent a year, whereas population in the 48 least developed countries 
is growing by 2.3 per cent, which means the population in these countries will double in only 30 years (UN, 
DESA and PD, 2009b). The ongoing population growth in poor countries is based on three factors: Firstly, due 
to improved health care in poor regions, most people live longer. In Asia, for example, average life expectancy 
has risen from 42 years at the beginning of the 1950s to currently 75 years (UN, DESA and PD, 2009b). 
Secondly, women in developing countries bear more children than women in the developed regions of the world. 
On the African continent, women have an average number of 4.5 children, in contrast to Europe where the 
number is 1.5 per woman (UN, DESA and PD, 2009b). Thirdly, the populations in developing countries are on 
average very young in age owing to high birth rates. In countries of sub-Saharan Africa alone, 42 per cent of the 
population is younger than age 15 (UN, DESA and PD, 2009b) – meaning that, in the future, there will be clearly 
more women of childbearing age. Even if women today had fewer children than their mothers, the population 
would continue to grow. 
 
Demographic Transition and Dividend 
Demographic dividend is defined as a rise in the rate of economic growth owing to a rising share of working age 
people in a population. This phenomenon occurs with a falling birth rate and the consequent shift in the age 
structure of the population towards the adult working ages. It is also commonly known as the demographic gift 
or bonus or demographic window. As cited by Ingle and Suryawanshi (2011), Cyrus and Lee (2000) state that, 
with many developing countries particularly on the Asian continent, experiencing a rapid decline in fertility, 
there has been overwhelming optimism that the demographic bonus will take these countries to greater economic 
heights (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Mason, 2003). As generally defined, demographic dividend occurs when 
a falling birth rate changes the age distribution, so that fewer investments are needed to meet the needs of the 
youngest age groups and resources are released for investments in economic development and family welfare 
(Ingle and Suryawanshi, 2011). 
The period of demographic dividend is an opportunity for overall growth, even though it is not the 
guarantee for improving the standard of living. This window of opportunity demands from youth, the right skills, 
and aptitude for employability. Developing nations go through a transition phase in which the economy shifts 
from agrarian to industrial production and growth of services sector. Industrial countries have largely completed 
what is called the “demographic transition” − the transition from a largely rural agrarian society with high 
fertility and mortality rates to a predominantly urban industrial society with low fertility and mortality rates. At 
an early stage of this transition, fertility rates fall, leading to fewer young mouths to feed (Ingle and Suryawanshi, 
2011). During this period, the labour force temporarily grows more rapidly than the population dependent on it, 
freeing up resources for investment in economic development and family welfare. Other things being equal, per 
capita income grows more rapidly and this is the first dividend followed by the second dividend, which is asset 
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accumulation. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
One of the goals of development policies is to create an environment for rapid economic growth towards 
achieving a demographic dividend of a population of a country. However, a framework of demographic dividend 
has been build to help explain the experience of certain countries in Asia, and later in successes in Latin America, 
and is creating a sense of optimism for improving the economic well-being of developing countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
The demographic dividend refers to the accelerated economic growth that begins with changes in the 
age structure of a country’s population as it transits from high to low birth and death rates. With fewer young 
people relative to the population of working-age adults, and with the successful implementation of key national 
policies over the long term, countries will reap many rewards from their demographic dividend. But many policy 
makers mistakenly think that a demographic dividend results automatically from a large population of young 
people relative to the population of working-age adults and without the needed population, as well as social and 
economic policies (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). This is not the case. Nations earning a demographic dividend 
have invested in human capital (health and education), implemented sound economic and governance policies, 
and sustained the political commitment necessary to make the most of the opportunity. Carrying out those 
policies can be challenging for a country’s social and governance structures, and not all countries may be able to 
take advantage of a dividend. Gribble and Bremner (2012) explain the demographic dividend in terms of 
demographic changes, investments in human capital and economic, and governance policies. 
Also, as a country’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR − the average number of children per woman) drops, the 
proportion of the population under age 15 begins to decrease relative to the adult working-age population 
(generally ages 15 to 64 − the child dependency ratio). The decline in this ratio sets the stage for smaller families, 
who now have more resources to invest in the health, education, and well-being of each child. And with fewer 
people to support, a country has a window of opportunity for rapid economic growth if the right social and 
economic policies are developed and investments are made. As long as the child dependency ratio continues to 
decrease, the window remains open. Eventually, however, people aged 65 and older begin to represent an 
increasingly larger proportion of the total population, signalling the end of the first demographic dividend 
(Gribble and Bremner, 2012). From a demographic perspective, these changes in the population age structure 
characterize the time frame during which a dividend can take place. But changes in the population age structure 
do not guarantee accelerated economic growth−the dividend is not automatic and requires a set of investments 
and policy commitments. 
As a first step in changing population structure, countries must go through a demographic 
transition−from high to low birth and death rates. Although most countries have made significant progress in 
reducing mortality, the countries that continue to experience sustained high levels of fertility are not poised for a 
demographic dividend. As long as fertility rates and resulting population growth rates remain high, the size of 
the child and adolescent population will be larger than the working-age adult population. In these circumstances, 
families and governments typically will not have the resources to invest in the health and well-being of children 
and be able to move toward a dividend (Gribble and Bremner, 2012).  
1.0 The Demographic Dividend Framework  
 
Adapted from Gribble, J. N. and Bremner, J. (2012: p. 3). Population Reference Bureau 
For instance, to achieve a demographic transition, countries must first focus on lowering fertility. One 
key strategy to achieving this goal is by providing women and men with voluntary family planning information 
and services. One in four women in developing countries wants to avoid becoming pregnant or delay or space 
births, but is not using a modern family planning method (Darroch et al., 2011). These women account for 
almost 80% of unintended pregnancies (WHO and UNICEF, 2012). Other factors, especially education and child 
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survival, contribute to the uptake of family planning and to lower fertility. When women can choose when and 
how often to become pregnant, they are more likely to have fewer children and are better able to achieve their 
desired family size. When women use modern contraception, a country’s population age structure can begin to 
change, setting the stage for a demographic dividend. 
Investing in health programmes for children and women is also crucial in achieving demographic 
dividend. A demographic dividend needs a healthy population, and a way to achieve that is by investing in child 
survival. Investments in child survival play a key role in sustaining lower levels of fertility; as child survival 
improves, the desire for a smaller family and demand for family planning will increase. In much of sub-Saharan 
Africa, couples still desire large families. But these desires are changing. Families will choose to have fewer 
children when they know that each child has a better chance of surviving (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). 
For children to make the most of educational opportunities, they must be healthy and attentive at 
school. Health programmes that provide immunizations and prevent and treat many common infections will help 
children to excel in school, and over the long term, to be better-skilled workers. Good nutrition fosters cognitive 
development among infants and young children and sustains child health. As children grow into adolescents, 
their health needs evolve. They must have access to reproductive health information and services to avoid 
unplanned pregnancies and to prevent HIV and sexually transmitted infections−all of which can undermine 
educational opportunities, especially for girls (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). When youth are developing 
behaviours that will shape the rest of their lives, health programmes need to address smoking, excessive alcohol 
use, sedentary lifestyles, and obesity−all of which lead to an increased burden on the health sector. 
Appropriate care during pregnancy and delivery plays a key role in reducing maternal and infant 
deaths. For young women, family planning can help delay their first pregnancy until an age when they are 
physically, psychologically, and socially prepared for childbearing (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). Delaying at 
first birth improves health outcomes for both mother and infant. And while programmes that address specific 
health issues are critical, there is also a need to strengthen health systems so that facilities offer the right 
combination of services, providers are appropriately trained, and supplies are available. Research demonstrates 
that good health is linked to strong health systems and programmes. Although, countries are paying attention to 
the Millennium Development Goal of Universal Primary Education, the quality of education remains a challenge. 
To grow a country’s economy, both boys and girls must have access to education. In the case of girls, 
education−especially at the secondary level−helps delay in marriage and first pregnancy. As countries 
experience a demographic dividend, they will need to adapt education policies in response to their changing 
labour market needs (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). The labour force may need training for lower-skilled and 
labour−intensive work as well as for more efficient and more value-added agricultural production. Then, as the 
economy grows and diversifies, workers will need a range of skills in business, technology, and other 
professions. 
In addition to health and education, an enabling environment for a demographic dividend needs good 
governance, which helps attract domestic and foreign investments in local economies. Since the demographic 
transition results in fewer children to care for, households gradually have more disposable income and savings 
that they can invest in their own businesses or in others. Similarly, good governance is critical to attracting 
foreign investments that can create jobs and stimulate economic growth. Established legal systems and the rule 
of law, especially contract law and financial standards, must be in place for people to be willing to invest in a 
local economy. If people are not confident that a contract will be honoured or laws enforced, they are not likely 
to invest in a local economy (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). Other aspects of good governance also contribute, 
such as reducing corruption and efficiently operating governments. 
Good governance promotes gender equality. A gender-equitable environment fosters a demographic 
transition by allowing women to access and use family planning without many of the barriers they currently face, 
especially in developing countries (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). Women can, therefore, contribute more to the 
family’s economic well-being by working outside the home. And better-educated women obtain higher-paying 
jobs and use their earnings to improve the human capital of their children. Other policies that promote gender 
equality, such as access to credit and the right to inherit property and assets, reflect an environment that 
empowers women to save and invest.  
Furthermore, enacting policies for economic growth is an essential instrument for demographic 
dividend to be achieved. Contributing to a demographic dividend are economic policies that promote growth. In 
particular, trade policies can ensure that local products have access to international markets and can create 
demand (Bloom et al., 2008). Policies are needed to provide incentives for people to save and invest; 
investments also require banks and other financial institutions to yield a profitable return for investors. A flexible, 
cross-trained labour force is also important as the size of the working-age population increases and the economy 
becomes more diversified. At the same time, experts indicate that it is important to be able to adjust 
salaries−increasing or decreasing them−in response to market conditions. Tax incentives are needed to 
encourage local and foreign investment, as well as basic infrastructure of ports, roads, transportation, and 
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communication (Gribble and Bremner, 2012). 
 
Demographic Transition and Development in Nigeria 
Demographic transition began in the 18th century in countries that are developed and still continues to date, but, 
in less developed countries, this demographic transition started later and is still at an earlier stage. However, 
some trends in communicable diseases, such as water−borne bacteria, malaria, polio, HIV/AIDS and Ebola, have 
become the leading source of mortality in countries like Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Nigeria. Rural 
Nigeria is experiencing stages two and three of demographic transition process. The feature of these two stages 
is that there is an increasingly rapid rise in population growth (population explosion) as the gap between deaths 
and births grow wider. The factors responsible for the population explosion in the rural areas is, first, 
improvement in the food supply by higher yields from modernized agricultural practices and government 
policies and better transportation of these agricultural yields. The second is the significant progress being made 
in public health and provision of primary health care centres in the rural areas for the reduction of under-five 
mortality and epidemic of communicable diseases, which entails the increasing survival of children and a 
growing population in the rural areas. These features of the demographic transition in the rural areas of Nigeria 
affect rural development positively.  
With the increasing population in the rural areas, the age structure (15-24 years) of this population 
becomes increasingly active and moves to the working age population. However, the positive features of the 
demographic transition in rural Nigeria is reflected in the continued decline in childhood death as a result of 
parents realizing that they do not need many children so as to ensure a comfortable old age; and increasing 
urbanization that changes the traditional values placed upon fertility and the value of children in rural society, 
that is, urban living, which increases the cost of dependent children to a family. Others are the introduction of 
compulsory and free education in the rural areas with the provision of free books for them; increasing female 
literacy and empowerment of women, which lowers the high rate of childbearing and motherhood as measures of 
the status of women; and substantial progress made in the availability of contraceptive and knowledge of how to 
use them. Also, there are the resulting changes in the age structure of the population of the rural areas, which 
include reduction in the youth dependency ratio and eventually population aging. In this period between the 
decline in youth dependency and rise in old age dependency, there is a demographic window of opportunity that 
can potentially produce economic growth through an increase in the ration of working age to dependent 
population, hence the demographic dividend of the population of the rural areas in Nigeria. 
 
Effects of Demographic Transition of Age Structure and Their Implications for Rural Development 
Population and development are inextricably linked. Until the last decade, the term development was used 
mainly in its economic sense. The term was, therefore, used to imply the capacity of a national economy whose 
initial economic conditions has been more or less static for a long time to generate and sustain an annual increase 
of its gross national product at rates of, perhaps, 5% to 7% or more. Another conception of development is the 
use of rates of growth of per capita Gross National Product (GNP) and this is supposed to take into consideration 
the ability of a nation to expand its output at a rate faster than the growth rate of its population. Development has 
also been conceived in terms of the planned alteration of the structure of production and employment so that 
agriculture’s share of both declines, whereas that of the manufacturing and service industries increases (Torado, 
1979).  
However, there is no universally accepted definition of rural development. The term is used in 
different ways in vastly divergent contexts. As a concept, it connotes the overall development of rural areas with 
a view to improving the quality of life of the rural people. As a phenomenon, it is the result of various physical, 
technological, economic, socio-cultural, and institutional factors. As a discipline, it is multi-disciplinary in nature, 
representing an intersection of agricultural, social, behavioural and management sciences. It is also a process that 
aims at improving the standard of living of the people living in the rural areas. According to United States 
Department of Agriculture (2006), rural development is the improvement in overall rural community conditions, 
including economic and other qualities of life considerations, such as the environment, health, infrastructure, and 
housing. 
The goal of development is the improvement of human dignity and human welfare. Population issues 
have been of concern to development for several thousands of years and, as such, the general concern was to 
stabilize the population to an optimum in terms of both the number and the quality of people. According to 
Morris (1967), as cited by Orubuloye and Oguntimehin (2000), population growth can be an impetus to 
development. For instance, increase in population can result in an increase in the total demand for goods and 
services, and the demand could be met by increased productivity (Orubuloye and Oguntimehin, 2000); a growing 
population will permit a better division of labour−the ratio of labour force to population would be improved; a 
growing population would afford economy of scale; and the growth of population will act as a challenge that will 
lead people to increase their efficiency.  
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However, there has been a relationship between population dynamics and the resources necessary to 
sustain human existence which has occupied an important position since the beginning of demographic studies. 
Although the Malthusian ideas have been heavily criticized because technological development has made 
increase in productivity possible, the problem of the discrepancy between population size and means of 
subsistence has, in recent years, taken a new dimension (Orubuloye and Oyeneye, 1983). The main concern has 
been the impact of population development growth on the rate and level of development. There has been no 
agreement among the various countries in the world on the nature of the relationship between population and 
development. Many advanced capitalist countries and some of their scholars believe that developing countries 
will be unable to move out of the vicious cycle of poverty unless population growth is brought under control. 
Many developing countries especially those with socialist government, insist on pushing the population issue 
aside, objecting the fact that the economic exploitation and political domination by the developed countries are 
the reasons for their relative poverty. In fact, some developing countries believe that population growth should 
be encouraged as it is beneficial to the development process because of the advantages which are associated with 
population growth.  
The decline in death rate and birth rate that occurs during the demographic transition leads to a radical 
transformation of the age structure. When the death rate declines during the second stage of the transition, the 
result is primarily an increase in the child population. The reason is that, when the death rate is high (stage one), 
the infant mortality rate is very high, often above 200 deaths per 1000 children born. When the death rate falls or 
improves, this, in general, results in a significantly lower infant mortality rate and, hence, increased child 
survival. Over time, as this age cohorts (15-24 years), increasing by higher survival rates, get older, there will 
also be an increase in the number of older children, teenagers, and young adults. This implies that there is an 
increase in the number of children born. Large cohorts of young adults add to the working-age population of 
developing economies. Despite much interest in the consequent growth dividend, the size and circumstances of 
the potential gains remain under-explored. This will further increase the growth of the child population. But the 
second stage of the demographic transition, therefore, implies a rise in child dependency. If the child dependency 
ratio is high, it depresses productivity per person and quality of life for both productive and dependent 
population. Besides child dependency ratio, stage two of the Demographic Transition Theory is characterized by 
a large number of young adults who, if well-managed, become a strong positive push for economic development. 
However, the large youthful population in rural Nigeria are constrained by some factors, such as unemployment 
and underemployment (that is the productive age-group are unemployed and under-employed), ineffective and 
unfocused government policies. 
The CIA World Factbook projection on Nigeria showed that in 2012, Nigeria had 170,123,740 persons. 
Within the population, the age structure comprised 0-14 years, 15-24 years, 25-54 years, 55-64 years, and 65 
years and over. The proportion of the population of the age structure estimates for the 2012 for the age cohort of 
0-14 years was 43.9%; 19.3% for the age cohort of 15-24 years; 30% for the age cohort of 25- 54 years; 3.8% for 
the age cohort of 55-64 years; and 3% for the age cohort of 65 years and over (CIA World Factbook, 2013). The 
projections for birth rate in Nigeria showed 39.23 births/1,000 population and the death rates showed 13.48 
deaths/1,000 population (CIA, 2012). However, 90,346,771 constituted the working age population of Nigeria, 
while 50% of the total population showed the rural and urban population (85,061,870). According to the CIA 
2010-2015 estimates, the rate of urbanization showed 3.5% annual rate of change in Nigeria (CIA, 2010-15 
estimates). 
 
Nigeria Age Structure 
Age Structure  
Age Cohort Proportion Male Female Total Population 
0-14 years 43.9% 38,232,053 36,483,243 74,715,296 
15-24 years 19.3% 16,757,436 16,018,589 32,776,025 
25-54 years 30% 25,123,834 25,945,571 51,069,405 
55-64 years 3.8% 2,981,187 3,520,154 6,501,341 
65 years and Above 3% 2325682 2735991 5061673 
Source: Adapted from CIA World Factbook, (2012: p. 3) 
 
The annual percentage of rural population growth in Nigeria is 1.1% and the percentage of total 
population is 51.6% (World Bank, 2012). Rural areas with a high proportion of children are likely to devote a 
high proportion of resources to their care, which tends to depress the pace of economic growth since they have a 
large proportion of their population in the younger age groups as fertility rates are high and life expectancy is 
low. Thus, with children more likely to survive into productive adulthood and fewer children being produced, the 
share of working age populations will increase. An increase in the working age ratio can raise the rate of 
economic growth, and hence confer a demographic dividend (Aiyar and Mody, 2011). People of working age are 
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on average more productive than those people outside this age group. Also, because workers save while 
dependents do not, a bulge in the working age ratio contributes to higher savings rates, increasing domestic 
resources available for productive investment. In addition, the fertility decline, that is, the source of the changed 
age structure may act directly to induce greater female labour supply (Bailey, 2006) and increase attention to 
primary education and health (Joshi and Schultz, 2006). People’s economic behaviour varies at different stages 
of life and changes in a country’s age structure can have significant effects on its economic performance. The 
effects are similar if a relatively less productive segment of the elderly needs a large share of resources (Bloom 
et al. 2007).  
This population pyramid for Nigeria provides the distribution of the population according to age and 
information is included by sex and age group (0-14 years, 15-64 years, 65 years and over). The age structure of a 
population affects a nation's key socio-economic issues. Countries with young populations (high percentage 
under age 15) need to invest more in schools, while countries with older populations (high percentage ages 65 
and over) need to invest more in the health sector. The age structure can also be used to help predict potential 
political issues. For instance, the rapid growth of a young adult population unable to find employment can lead 
to unrest and insurgency. 
, 
Fig. 2.0 Population Pyramid Showing Age and Sex Structure of the Demographic Transition Stages. 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook, (2013: p.  3.) 
 
If most of a nation’s population falls within the working ages output per capita will be high if all other 
factors being equal. As countries move through the demographic transition from a high fertility and high 
mortality to a low fertility and low mortality equilibrium, the size of the working age population mechanically 
increases. This can create virtuous cycles of economic growth commonly referred to as the “demographic 
dividend.” Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003) explore this concept of the demographic dividend in detail and 
compare the variation in the age distribution across countries and regions. More developed countries have lower 
fertility rates and higher life expectancy and thus a large proportion of their population is at higher ages. Lee 
(2003) and Weil (1999) discuss the projected demographic transition and the effect of this transition on 
economic outcomes, respectively. While most regions around the world are evolving through the demographic 
transition, Africa stands as an outlier. Fertility rates are high and falling only slightly and life expectancy is 
actually falling in some countries owing to the impact of HIV/AIDS and Ebola. 
Jua (2003) observes that the economic crisis and the subsequent reforms in the world and Africa, in 
particular, not only had negative effects on young people’s ability to fulfil their ambition and to live up to the 
expectations placed upon them, but also impaired their capacity to master the transition “out of youth” into 
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adulthood (Okunola, 2013). As a result, the working population becomes “stretched out” if the economic and 
social statuses required for adulthood are unattainable for young adults. The population in the rural areas has 
become vulnerable to unemployment and under-employment as well as to socio-economic exploitation and 
deprivations. With little or no formal education resulting in limited chances of gainful employment, the youth 
become susceptible to crime and other social vices (Nigerian National Youth Policy, 2001). This becomes more 
damaging in the rural areas where the centre-periphery development strategy has placed the rural areas at 
developmental disadvantage (Okunola, 2013). 
For instance, unemployment is one of the most critical problems Nigeria is facing. The years of 
corruption, civil war, military rule, and mismanagement have hindered economic growth of the country. Nigeria 
is endowed with diverse and infinite resources, both human and material. However, years of neglect and adverse 
policies have led to the under-utilization of these resources (NBS, 2010). These resources have not been 
effectively utilized in order to yield maximum economic benefits. This is one of the primary causes of 
unemployment and poverty in Nigeria (NBS, 2010). Statistics from the 2010 National Bureau Survey (NBS) 
showed that the national unemployment rate was 21.1% of the labour force in 2010. The rate was higher in the 
rural area (24.2%) than in the urban area (15.2%). Unemployment rate was highest among the youths in the age-
group 15-24 years, with a figure of 35.9%; followed by those aged 25-34 years (23.3%) and the age group 35-44 
years (16.8%). Also, the unemployment rate by sex (male and female) showed that the rate was higher among 
the female (35.6%) and the rate of unemployment was high in the age group 15-24 years (NBS, 2010). The 
analysis by educational status also suggested that the rural people, mainly affected by unemployment were those 
without basic education.  
The currently economically active population is also referred to as the labour force. The labour force is 
conceptually equivalent to the labour supply available for the production of economic goods and services in a 
given short reference period. The labour force is the most widely used measure of the economically active 
population. The term 'labour force', as defined in the international standards, is associated with a particular 
approach to the measurement of employment and unemployment. Essentially, this approach is the categorization 
of people according to their activities during a short reference period using a specific set of priority rules. The 
labour force framework classifies the in-scope population into three mutually exclusive categories, at a given 
point in time: employed; unemployed; and not in the labour force. The employed and unemployed categories 
together make up the labour force which gives a measure of the number of people contributing to, or willing to 
contribute to, the supply of labour at that time. The third category (not in the labour force) represents the 
currently inactive population. Diagram 2 shows these concepts: 
 
DIAGRAM 2: THE LABOUR FORCE FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Staistics, (2013: p. 5) 
 
The labour force framework includes rules for sorting the population into the three basic categories. 
These rules are applied in population surveys through three steps. The first involves identifying the in-scope 
population. The second involves identifying, within the in-scope population, those people who are engaged in 
economic activity, defined as either at work or temporarily absent from work. The third step involves identifying, 
among the remaining people, those people who are actively seeking and available for work, or who are not 
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seeking work because they were waiting to commence a job that they have already found. The labour force 
framework classifies people identified in the second step as employed, and those identified in the third step as 
unemployed. The residual population is classified as ‘not in the labour force’. The labour force framework rules 
have the following features: 
• the activity principle, which is used to classify the population into one of the three basic categories in the 
labour force framework; 
• a set of priority rules, which ensures that each person is classified into only one of the three basic categories; 
• a short reference period to reflect the labour supply situation at a specified point in time.  
The rationale for the treatment of people temporarily absent from work, and of people waiting to start a 
job they have already found, stems directly from the labour supply perspective. Nigeria is generally endowed 
with a great deal of resources (both natural and human), which any society needs to transform the socio-
economic conditions of its people for the better (Okunola, 2013). According to Salawu (2010) and Falola et al. 
(2011), as cited by Okunola (2013), among the resources with which Nigeria is blessed are availability of 
unlimited arable lands, half of which remain fallow; leading agricultural products, such as cocoa, rubber, coffee, 
groundnuts, cotton, cashew, mangoes, and oranges, which are valuable raw materials for agro-allied industries; 
and, above all, mineral resources of various types, the most important of which are petroleum oil, bitumen, 
precious, precious stones and gold (Okunola, 2013). Very important too is the high quality of human resources. 
The majority of the material resources are located in the rural areas of the country; rural areas serve as the base 
for the production of food and fibre. Olatunbosun (1975), as cited by Okunola (2013), notes that they are also the 
major sources of capital formation for the country, and a principal market for domestic manufactures. In general 
terms, the rural areas engage in primary activities that form the foundation for any economic development (Issa 
et al., 2012). 
However, despite these enormous resources, the socio-economic life in the rural areas is characterized 
by poverty, hunger, inadequate social amenities, and poor infrastructure, among others. In other words, the 
alarming increase in the rate of poverty has gone contrary to available natural resources and wealth of the 
country (Okunola, 2013). According to World Bank (1996) and Falola et al. (2011), as cited by Okunola (2013), 
the description of Nigeria as a paradox of plenty by the World Bank (1996) has continued to be confirmed by 
events and official statistics in the country. Rather than record remarkable progress in national socio-economic 
development, Nigeria retrogressed to become one of the 25 poorest countries at the threshold of twenty-first 
century, whereas she was among the richest 50 in the early 1970s. The situation has worsened since the late 
1990s, to the extent that the country is now considered one of the 20 poorest countries in the world (Okunola, 
2013). 
The socio-economic situations in most rural areas of Nigeria have always been below the recommended 
best practices in terms of rural development. This is a clear indication of the adverse effects of many 
administrative and economic/ development policies designed to improve the status of rural communities in 
Nigeria (Okunola, 2013). One of the major factors in the political economy of rural Nigeria, is the lack of clear-
cut idea of what the issue actually entails. In the real sense, there were no serious efforts towards having a 
concrete plan on national rural development in Nigeria prior to 1976. What was in vogue during the pre-1976 era 
was segmented or uncoordinated rural development where it was assumed that new programmes in one 
community would have ripple effects on other communities and institutions. 
Oyaide (1988) as quoted by Okunola (2013), such rural development was established to mobilize the 
rural people, initiate local projects with local leadership, promote agriculture, and rural development. 
Community projects were added to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and later replaced with Water Resources. 
These occurred because Nigeria was not certain about the place of rural development because Nigeria was not 
certain about the place of rural development in the overall national development strategy (Oyaide, 1988). Most 
of the efforts to uplift the status of the rural Nigerian lacked a philosophical, ideological, and holistic foundation. 
It had a body of policy-makers and government functionaries but had no soul to give it life and sense of direction. 
The usual practice has been to be in office propounding slogans and manifestations for the people below. That 
was instrumental to the failure of some rural development projects, such as Farm Settlement Scheme, Operation 
Feed the Nation, Green Revolution, and River Basin Scheme for Agriculture, to mention a few. An internal 
motivating and compelling force or commitment stemming from faith and love of the people in the rural sector 
and determination to work for their uplift typifies a philosophical base. 
The social and cultural dimensions of development are regarded as subordinate to the economic 
development. Many of the innovations introduced to improve rural communities did not guarantee the 
cohesiveness of the group and respect for their history and beliefs have little hope of survival (Okunola, 2013). 
In addition to this, there is always the tendency to rely on official leadership for carrying out rural projects. 
These official leaders are not prepared to motivate and sustain the enthusiasm of the people in the face of 
conflicts, depressions, and unfulfilled expectations. The top-down approach to rural development employed by 
government functionaries whip up enthusiasm among the people, as there is absence of total community 
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participation. Owing to the approach adopted, people evoke unwilling response as they are regarded as being 
incapable of standing on their feet.  
In addition, there is little or no attempt to allow the rural communities to identify the problems and 
goals, analyze their own needs, and commit themselves to the achievement of targets (Okunola, 2013). Local 
experts, chiefs and community leaders are taken for granted in deciding what projects to embark upon, and 
where and how to execute them. The planners do not consult even the interest groups, the co-operatives, and 
professional organizations. More importantly, the pattern in Rural Development Programmes in Nigeria centre 
on the imposition of imported schemes whether or not they are related to the cultural and sociological life of the 
people. Such examples of these areas mentioned above already exist, not making use of youth organizations, age 
grades, and women’s groups in the initiation and implementation of programmes. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, rural poverty has been a subject of concern in Nigeria and there is no doubt that there have been 
various attempts to improve the conditions in rural areas of Nigeria. Various forms of rural programmes and 
project development have been initiated in the rural areas but they fail during the implementation stage. The 
disjoint development course, especially in rural areas of Nigeria, has created a conglomeration of abandoned 
rural project developments in Nigeria. Although, as a result of inconsistent policies and rural project 
development framework, rural areas are underdeveloped even when there are developmental projects in them. 
 The rural areas in Nigeria are going through the stage two of the demographic transition process in 
which over−population in the rural areas should help in the production and supply of economic goods and 
services in Nigeria. The main point of those who believe in this line of argument is that population growth in 
many developing countries or regions is, in fact, desirable to stimulate rapid development. With population 
growth, labour will be available to develop the resources of the country or region concerned and this will 
eventually result in the overall development in such areas. One is, therefore, tempted to call for increase in 
population size in such locations. This is because the increase in size of population for the rural areas should lead 
to increase in the production of economic activities within the working population age structure. All things being 
equal, this should lead to greater development of the rural areas if the various rural development projects are 
properly aligned to study the socio-cultural and economic needs of the rural people and are effectively 
implemented. 
 
Recommendations 
From the discussion so far, it is recommended that the government implement policies that go beyond fertility 
control aimed at shrinking incoming generation. Energy should be directed at converting the demographic bonus 
of large population to demographic dividend through an aggressive youth−centred and culture-centred education, 
and a nationally−oriented mobilisation that will ensure youths become the building blocks of economic 
development. The extent to which countries are able to capitalize on a demographic dividend depends largely on 
their responses to these policy areas. In the words of Gribble and Bremner (2012), lowering fertility in order to 
change the age-structure of the population is a first step, but it is insufficient by itself to accelerate economic 
growth. Health, education, governance, and economic policies all contribute to an enabling environment for a 
demographic dividend. A dividend also depends on how a country responds to external factors, such as global 
economic changes, wars, and technological advances. 
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